Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
T his study takes advantage of a recent series of household surveys on charitable giving, conducted from 1987 to 1995, to estimate price and income elasticities of charitable giving. Initially, the five cross-sections are pooled, to account for how charitable giving varies over time and across cohorts more fully than in a single cross-section. I also take advantage of price variation due to modest changes in tax laws, rather than just changes in personal characteristics. When the five surveys are pooled, I estimate a price elasticity of -0.9 to -1.1 and an income elasticity of approximately 0.30.
I then construct a 'cohort panel' from the five surveys. A cohort panel is distinguished from a true panel in that it tracks cohorts, rather than households, through a series of crosssectional surveys.
1 With the cohort panel, introduced by , I can apply techniques developed for panel data to estimate a cohort fixed-effects demand equation for charitable giving. I estimate price and income elasticities that are quite similar to those in the pooled cross-sectional analysis. The price elasticity estimates, though lower than most estimates from early studies using cross-sectional data, are higher than those reported in most recent studies using taxpayer panel data.
Finally, I use respondents' own reports of their motivations for giving to separate two years of the sample into those who regard tax considerations and deductions as (a) a major motivation, (b) a minor motivation, or (c) not a motivation to give to charity. Those who are most 'tax-motivated' exhibit the highest price elasticity of giving, equal to -2.2. For those who are not tax-motivated, the estimated price elasticity is not statistically different from zero. The price elasticity estimates are consistent with respondents' own reports of their motivations for giving. This corroborates the price elasticity estimates as a measure of respondents' sensitivity to changes in the price of charitable giving.
BACKGROUND
There are many studies on the tax treatment of charitable contributions.
2 Early studies using cross-sectional data generally found the price elasticity to be greater than one in absolute value, and often much higher. Estimates of income elasticities ranged from 0.5 to 0.9.
The advantage of using household survey data is that they contain information on the charitable giving of both itemizers and nonitemizers, as well as information on demographic characteristics. However, with cross-sectional data, it is difficult to account fully for the heterogeneity of respondents even with substantial information on their socioeconomic characteristics.
More recent studies account more completely for individual heterogeneity by using taxpayer panel data and estimating a fixed-effect demand equation for charitable giving. Furthermore, the use of panel data allows an independent source of variation in the price of giving-variation that results from statutory changes in marginal tax rates, rather than differences in the personal characteristics of respondents. 3 The more recent studies, which include Broman (1989) , Ricketts and Westfall (1993) , Randolph (1995) , and Barrett, McGuirk, and Steinberg (1997) , estimate price elasticities that are much less than one in absolute value. 4 The use of panel data allows for the incorporation of dynamics into the charitable giving equation. Randolph (1995) , for instance, distinguishes between current (transitory) and expected future (permanent) income and the price of giving. He finds evidence that changes in marginal tax rates affect the timing, more than the overall level of charitable giving, with an estimated permanent price elasticity of -0.51 and an estimated transitory price elasticity of -1.55.
In addition, Andreoni, Gale, and Scholz (1995) develop a structural model of charitable contributions of money and volunteering. They use the 1989 Independent Sector survey, and estimate a price elasticity of -0.35 and an income elasticity of 0.28. These studies challenge the view that the charitable deduction stimulates enough charitable giving to offset the resulting loss in tax revenue. However, Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter (1999) , examine charitable giving within a life-cycle model of consumption and report price elasticities that range from -0.6 to -1.2.
Unfortunately, panel income tax data contain information only on those who file a tax return and itemize their deductions. Nonitemizers, whose price of charitable 2 See Clotfelter (1985) and Steinberg (1990) for comprehensive reviews. 3 One cross-sectional study, Feenberg (1987) , uses state tax rates as an independent source of variation in the price of charitable giving. He finds a price elasticity of -1.63 and an income elasticity of 0.73. Interestingly, these results are similar to results of studies that do not account for the potential endogeneity of the price of giving. 4 The study by Barret, McGuirk, and Steinberg (1997) updates an earlier paper by Barrett (1991) 5 The cohort panel will allow me to estimate the effect of the tax treatment of charitable contributions on private donations of money within a cohort fixed-effects model. In addition, the modest changes in federal tax rates from 1987 to 1995 allow for exogenous variation in the price of charitable giving.
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
The data are from a series of biennial surveys conducted for the Independent Sector from 1987 to 1995. The Independent Sector Surveys on Giving and Volunteering consist of persons 18-years-old and over selected to be representative of the United States population. Some oversampling was done of black and Hispanic households, and affluent households in the 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1995 surveys. Respondents were asked to provide personal information such as age, race, sex, labor market activity, income, wage rate, marital status, number of children, years of schooling, and itemization status. Respondents also provided information on the amount of money and estimated value of property the household contributed in the previous year for charitable purposes. The 1987 The , 1989 The , 1991 surveys each contain information on over 2,600 individuals, while the 1993 survey contains information on over 1,500. All of the surveys include information on both itemizers and nonitemizers.
The weighted means of selected variables from the five Independent Sector surveys are displayed in Table 1 . 6 The per- To compare the Independent Sector data to previous data sources on charitable giving, I estimate a reduced-form demand equation for charitable giving similar to those estimated in early studies using cross-sectional data. The dependent variable is the natural log of charitable giving. The independent variables of interest are the natural log of household income and the natural log of the price of a charitable contribution, whose coefficient estimates are interpreted as constant elasticities. 10 Other explanatory variables included are the number of children in the household, and the age and years of education of the primary wage-earner. Indicator variables for whether the primary wage-earner is female, married, or a nonHispanic white are also included. The price and income elasticity estimates are displayed in Table 2 . The estimated price elasticities, between 1.3 and 2.4 in absolute value, and the estimated income elasticities, between 0.37 and 0.55, are comparable to those found in early studies using cross-sectional data. The estimation results indicate that charitable giving increases with age, with number of children, and with years of education.
11 Married persons contribute more than those who are single, divorced, widowed, or separated and non-Hispanic whites contribute more to charity than non-whites. These findings are in accordance with previous studies on charitable contributions.
Thus, we can be reasonably confident that the estimates from the pooled crosssectional and cohort panel analyses do not result from the use of an unusual collection of cross-sectional surveys.
POOLED CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS
The series of Independent Sector surveys provide an opportunity to study charitable giving over time. In this section, the five survey years are combined and a charitable giving equation is estimated, in order to gain insight into how giving varies over time and across cohorts.
12 However, because the data are cross-sectional, I cannot incorporate dynamics into the charitable giving equation. Thus, I cannot distinguish transitory from permanent effects of income and price changes.
I employ the tobit estimation method to account for the approximately 30 percent of the sample who do not contribute to charity. The charitable giving equation includes indicator variables for whether the primary wage earner is female, a nonHispanic white, or married, as well as variables for the number of children under 18 in the household, and the years of education of the primary wage-earner. Demographic variables, not available in previous studies, are also included in the charitable giving equation. The additional variables are indicator variables for home ownership, church or synagogue membership, and participation in volunteer work. Home ownership and church or synagogue membership serve as indicators of the respondent's level of attachment to the community and of the degree of exposure to giving opportunities. Vol- Table 3 . The estimated income elasticity is 0.30 and the estimated price elasticity is -1.14, evaluated at the means of the data. Four years of the Independent Sector data also have information on whether the household was asked to give money in the previous year, and whether the respondent is a long term (5-years or more) resident in the community. Freeman (1997) finds that being asked to volunteer had a significant effect on one's probability of volunteering.
Being asked to give money may also be a factor in predicting monetary contributions as well. Long-term residency in the community may increase the household's level of attachment to the community.
In the third and fourth columns of Table  3 , the results of the estimation including dummy variables for being asked to give money and being a long-term resident in the community, variables not included in the 1987 survey, are displayed. Being asked to give money has a large and positive effect on charitable giving, but being a long-term resident does not have a statistically significant effect on giving. The inclusion of these variables and the exclusion of the 1987 data has a small effect on the income elasticity estimate-increasing it from 0.30 to 0.32, and a larger effect on the price elasticity-decreasing it from 1.14 to 0.94 in absolute value.
13 13 The estimation of the equation without the indicator variables for being a long-term resident and being asked to give, and excluding the 1987 data, results in a price elasticity of -1.06 and an income elasticity of .32. Thus There is reason to believe that the indicator variables for volunteer participation and being asked to give money are not exogenous to the charitable giving decision. If these variables are positively correlated with the disturbance term in the charitable giving equation, their coefficient estimates will be biased upwards. If the coefficient estimates on the potentially endogenous variables were of primary interest in the charitable giving equation, it would be advisable to employ an instrumental variables procedure to correct for the endogeneity problem. However, the coefficient estimates on these variables are not the main focus of this study, and so an instrumental variables procedure is not employed. The coefficient estimates on volunteer participation and being asked to give money should be interpreted with caution.
COHORT PANEL ANALYSIS
In the previous section, a charitable giving equation was estimated, using the pooled Independent Sector surveys. In this section, the five surveys are converted into a cohort panel data set. A cohort panel data set exploits the rich set of demographic information on both nonitemizers and itemizers that is available in the Independent Sector surveys and allows for the use of panel data estimation techniques. Rather than following the same individual over time, a cohort panel is constructed to follow a cohort through a series of cross-sectional surveys. A cohort is a group whose membership is fixed over time and who can be identified throughout the surveys.
Under certain conditions, discussed in Appendix C, the cohort means can be treated as individual observations and a fixed-effects demand equation for charitable giving can be estimated. With regular panel data, the fixed effects model allows for each individual to have her own particular average level of charitable giving over time. The fixed effect refers to the characteristics (both observable and unobservable) of each individual that are constant over time and that affect her average level of charitable giving. In cohort panel analysis, the fixed effect is specific to the cohort, rather than to the individual. Each cohort is used as its own control in the estimation of the price and income elasticities of charitable giving.
Construction of the Cohort Panel
In this study, cohorts are defined by year of birth, race, and education. For example, Cohort 1 includes respondents in the 1987 survey who are age 18 to 32, are nonwhite, and have a high school degree or less. The members of Cohort 1 are tracked, as they age, through the five surveys. Therefore, Cohort 1 consists of respondents who are non-white and have a high school degree or less, and are age 20 to 34 in the 1989 survey, age 22 to 36 in the 1991 survey, age 24 to 38 in the 1993 survey, and age 26 to 40 in the 1995 survey. Each of the other 15 cohorts are also defined by their year of birth, race and educational attainment, and are tracked as they age through the five surveys. This yields 16 observations per year, with the largest cohort cell containing 340 respondents.
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Errors in Variables Estimation
With true panel data, I could estimate a charitable giving equation that incorporates a fixed effect for each respondent.
the exclusion of the 1987 data causes the price elasticity to decrease from 1.14 to 1.06 in absolute value, and the inclusion of the indicator variables for being a long-term resident and being asked to give to charity cause the price elasticity to decrease from 1.06 to .94 in absolute value. The slight change in the estimated income elasticities can be explained almost entirely by the exclusion of the 1987 data. 14 Table C.1 in Appendix C further illustrates the way each cohort is defined and displays the number of respondents in each cohort in each survey.
With cohort panel data, the fixed effect applies to each cohort, whose membership is constant over time. Since the individual fixed effect of each cohort member does not change over time, the cohort fixed effect, which is simply the average of the cohort members' individual fixed effects, also does not change over time. However, because I have information on only those cohort members who were respondents to the Independent Sector surveys, the sample cohort fixed effect is an approximation of the population cohort fixed effect. Thus, the effectiveness of using the cohort as its own control depends on how well the sample cohort fixed effect approximates the population cohort fixed effect. The other variables in the charitable giving equation are also sample means, which are approximations of the cohort means in the population. The use of cohort sample means to approximate cohort population means necessitates the use of an errors-in-variables estimation technique, which is a fairly straightforward extension of the fixed effects estimation used with true panel data.
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Estimation Results
The cohort-specific fixed effects estimation is used on a specification including characteristics not available in taxpayer panels-dummy variables for church or synagogue membership and participation in volunteer work. If these variables influence giving and change over a person's lifetime, it is important to include them in the charitable giving equation. 16 The results of the cohort-specific fixed effects estimation are displayed in the first column of Table 4 . The estimated price elasticity is -1.15 and the estimated income elasticity is 0.24. Charitable giving is positively associated with being a church or synagogue member and with participating in volunteer work.
The equation includes indicator variables which capture the race, education, and year of birth of household heads in each cohort. Also included are three indicator variables for year effects. The F statistics indicate that the race and education effects are jointly significant at the 0.05 level and the year effects are jointly significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient estimates (not shown) indicate that nonHispanic whites and those who have at least completed high school give more to charitable organizations, and that, relative to 1987, giving is higher in 1989 and lower in 1991, 1993, and 1995. The birth cohort effects indicate that older cohorts give more to charitable organizations than younger cohorts, but are jointly significant only at the 0.17 level.
I test the sensitivity of the estimation results to the composition of the cohort panel, and the results are presented in the second and third columns of Table 4 . For the second column, the 1993 Independent Sector survey, which has substantially fewer observations and did not oversample blacks, Hispanics, and affluent households, is excluded from the cohort panel. For the third column, the two cohorts with the smallest cell sizes are excluded from the cohort panel. The excluded cohorts are the two oldest nonwhite groups whose members have at 15 derives the errors-in-variables estimator and variance-covariance matrix for cohort panel data.
A more detailed explanation of the errors-in-variables estimator as applied to this charitable giving equation can be found in Tiehen (1999) . 16 See Appendix D for evidence on how church membership and volunteer participation change over time. It should be noted that, if tax policy directly influences church membership or volunteer participation (or any of the other explanatory variables), the price elasticity estimate will be biased. For instance, if a lower price of giving directly induces more church membership or greater volunteer participation, the price effect on charitable giving will be understated. However, it is difficult, without further research, to determine the magnitude of this bias.
least completed high school. Both changes to the cohort panel result in an estimated price elasticity of approximately -0.95, although the marginal significance level is 0.12 when the 1993 survey is excluded. The estimated income elasticity measure is more sensitive to the composition of the cohort panel. When the 1993 survey is excluded, the income elasticity increases from 0.24 to 0.35 and when the two smallest cohorts are excluded, the income elasticity become quite small and statistically insignificant.
It is not possible to use the cohort panel to estimate a dynamic model of charitable giving, because of data constraints. Thus, the elasticity estimates reflect a combination of both transitory and permanent effects. However, the use of a fixed effects estimation technique may bias the estimates toward a transitory effect, since each variable is expressed as a difference from its average over time. It is difficult to test to what extent the elasticity estimates are biased toward the transitory component. If the fixed-effects estimates are biased toward a transitory effect, then the price elasticity should decrease in absolute value and the income elasticity should increase when the charitable giving equation is estimated without removing the cohort fixed effects. However, as Broman (1989) notes, the removal of fixed effects also eliminates a bias in the crosssectional analysis caused by omitted explanatory variables. When the charitable giving equation is estimated without removing the cohort fixed effects, the price elasticity estimate increases (in absolute terms) to -1.4 and the income elasticity estimate increases to 0.42. While this increase in both the price and income effects is consistent with Broman's findings, the increase in the income elasticity is also consistent with the theory that the cohort fixed effects income elasticity is biased toward a transitory effect.
SELF-REPORTED MOTIVATIONS FOR GIVING
The Independent Sector surveys, in addition to providing information on a rich set of demographic characteristics, offer a unique chance to examine respondents' own accounts of their motivations for giving to charitable organizations. In particular, in the 1989 and 1991 surveys, respondents are asked whether tax considerations and deductions are a major motivation, a minor motivation, or are not a motivation to give to charitable organizations.
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Thirty-eight percent of respondents in the combined 1989 and 1991 surveys report that tax considerations and deductions are a major or a minor motivation to give to charity. These 'tax-motivated' givers have a higher average contribution than those who report that tax considerations are not a motive to give. In the combined samples, tax-motivated givers contribute an average of $1,347 annually, while non-tax-motivated givers contribute an average of $1,215 annually, in 1995 dollars. However, tax-motivated givers have a higher average income of $62,087, compared to $47,595 for non-tax-motivated givers.
To control for the effect of income, the sample of charitable givers in each year is separated into ten income categories, as shown in Table 5 . As household income increases, the likelihood of reporting that tax considerations and deductions are a motive to give increases. This is not surprising, since the benefit of the tax deduction for charitable giving increases with the marginal tax rate, and therefore, with household income. The percentage of respondents who itemize deductions also increases with income. Only 11.7 percent of givers with household income less than $10,000 itemize their deductions, while 89.7 percent of givers with household income of $100,000 or more itemize their deductions. Table 6 compares the average gift of tax-motivated givers to that of nontax motivated givers at each income level. In five of the ten income groups, tax-motivated givers contribute less on average than non-tax-motivated givers. As a group, tax-motivated givers have a higher average contribution than do non-taxmotivated givers, but a tax-motivated giver will not necessarily give more than a non-tax-motivated of the same income level. In fact, for households with real income greater than $80,000, non-tax-motivated givers contribute more on average than tax-motivated givers.
Although those who report being taxmotivated are more likely to itemize deductions, as seen in the final column of Table 7 , reported tax motivation and itemization status are not identical. Almost 30 percent of givers report that they itemize deductions, but that their charitable giving is not motivated by tax considerations and deductions. On the other hand, 13.8 percent of givers report that they do not itemize deductions, but that their giving 17 The question reads, "The questions immediately before dealt with charitable giving, now I have a few questions about your personal motivation that may involve both charitable giving of money and volunteering in general, not just last year. Were tax considerations and deductions a major motivation, a minor motivation, or not a motivation for your charitable giving or volunteering?" Respondents were asked about eleven possible motivations to give or volunteer. The question regarding tax considerations and deductions is Q.54(a) in the 1989 survey and Q.67(k) in the 1991 survey.
is tax-motivated. Although these individuals apparently receive no benefit from the tax deduction, they may be tax-motivated and simply would have contributed more had they itemized deductions and faced a lower price of giving during the survey year.
I can use respondents' own accounts of whether they are motivated by tax considerations and deductions to corroborate the price elasticity estimates. I would expect that those who report tax considerations and deductions as a motivation to give would be more sensitive to the price of giving. Evidence for this is displayed in Table 8 , which contains results from the tobit estimation of charitable giving equations using the pooled 1989 and 1991 data, where the sample is separated according to the extent to which respondents are motivated by tax considerations and deductions.
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The more that respondents are motivated by tax considerations and deductions, the higher their price elasticities and the lower their income elasticities of charitable giving. The estimated price elasticity is -2.21 for those who regard tax considerations and deductions as a major motivation, while it is -0.79 for those who regard them as a minor motivation, and 0.02 (and not statistically significant) for those who do not regard them as a motivation to give. Thus, the information that respondents provide about their motivations for giving corroborates the price elasticity estimates. Interestingly, the estimated income elasticities also vary with the reported tax-motivation of respondents. Income elasticity estimates range from 0.03 (and not statistically significant) for those who are most tax-motivated to 0.36 for those who are not tax-motivated in their charitable giving.
CONCLUSION
Estimates of the price and income elasticities of charitable giving play an important role in the debate over the appropri- 18 Respondents were asked about their motivations to give whether or not they had given during the survey year. The entire 1989 and 1991 samples are used for the estimation. Of those who did not contribute, 32.4 percent report being tax-motivated. It may be that timing of their giving is affected by the tax environment. They did not give during the survey year because it was more advantageous to give in previous years or they expected it to be more advantageous to give in subsequent years. The cohort panel analysis applied here to the estimation of price and income elasticities of charitable giving could also be useful in a number of different contexts. A cohort panel can be constructed with any series of cross-sectional surveys, provided that cohorts can be identified whose membership is constant over time. For example, Moffitt (1993; 1999) constructs cohort panels from the Current Population Survey; it could also be used with other U.S. surveys, such as the Consumer Expenditure Survey or the Survey of Consumer Finances.
Although the price elasticity estimates are not as great as those found in many early studies, they do imply that charitable giving is responsive to tax incentives. Further, I find that the more taxmotivated the respondent, the higher their price elasticity. Those who report being most tax-motivated have a price elasticity of -2.2. For the three-fifths of the sample who report that they are not taxmotivated, the estimated price elasticity is 0.02 and not statistically different from zero. These results corroborate the price elasticity estimates as a measure of the responsiveness of charitable giving to its tax treatment. 65 and over. I cannot identify whether the respondent is eligible for the additional deduction for the blind. For respondents who itemize deductions, the Independent Sector survey does not contain information on the total of their itemized deductions. Therefore, each respondent is assigned an itemization amount, based on data from the Statistics of Income on the average amount of itemized deductions claimed in that survey year for their income and filing status.
Taxable Income and the Marginal Tax Rate: Taxable income is computed as household income minus deductions minus exemptions. The marginal tax rate used to define the price of giving is that which applies to the last dollar of income earned. It is customary to calculate the price of giving as if no charitable contributions were made, so that the resulting 'first dollar' price is that faced on the first dollar of charitable contribution. However, in this study each respondent is assigned an itemization amount based on the average amount of itemized deductions for their income and filing status, and it therefore did not seem sensible to deduct their actual charitable contributions from their assigned itemization amount. Further, the surveys span a period of wide tax brackets and it is unlikely that the first-dollar price would be different from the marginal price faced by most respondents. Indeed, when an estimated 'first dollar' price is used to estimate price and income elasticities in the separate cross-sections, there is little difference from the price and income elasticities presented in Table 2 .
However, Clotfelter (1987) notes that for borderline itemizers, those who would not itemize their deductions in the absence of charitable contributions, the first dollar price may be quite different from the marginal price. In this study it is assumed that a household who itemizes is a borderline itemizer if they do not own a home and if their charitable contributions represent more than 50 percent of their applicable standard deduction. Homeowners are ruled out as borderline itemizers since, in all of the survey years, the average mortgage interest deduction is greater than the standard deduction for households of any filing status. The price elasticity estimates are not affected appreciably by the requirement that charitable contributions represent more than 50 percent of the applicable standard deduction. If all itemizers who do not own a home are classified as borderline itemizers, the price elasticity estimate is -1.02, whereas if only those whose contributions are at least equal to the applicable standard deduction are classified as borderline itemizers, the price elasticity estimate is -1.14. With the definition used in this study, 0.8 percent of itemizing households are categorized as borderline itemizers, and are assigned a price of one.
Appendix B: Demographic Variables in the Independent Sector Surveys Sector data should be noted. First, the mean years of education of respondents increase from 1987 to 1995. This is consistent with the Current Population Survey finding that the percentage of people age 25 and over who had completed four years of high school or more increased from 75.6 percent in 1987 to 81.7 in 1995. Second, the 1993 survey contains fewer observations than the other years, and does not over-sample blacks, Hispanics, and affluent households. The estimation results from the cohort panel may be sensitive to the inclusion of the 1993 survey, so I test for this in the econometric analysis. 
